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Just like soldiers crossing a bridge in sync can lead to a catastrophic failure, we show via 
experiments, theory, and simulations, how synchronization in human decision making 
can lead to extreme outcomes. Individual decision making and risk taking are well 
known to be gender dependent[1-8].  Much less is however understood about gender’s 
impact on the creation of collective risk through aggregate decision making, where the 
decision of one individual can affect the decision making of other individuals, eventually 
leading to synchronization in behavior[9-13]. To study the formation of collective risk 
created due to synchronization in human decision making, we have devised a series of 
experiments that can be analyzed and understood within a game theoretical framework. 
In the experiments each individual in groups of either men or women decide to buy or 
sell a financial asset based on an information set containing past price behavior. Risk 
can be generated collectively through coordination in the aggregate decision making, 
which leads to a price formation far from the fundamental value of the asset. Here we 
show how collective risks can be generated in groups of both genders, but the pathway 
to formation of collective risks happens through an individual risk taking which are 
different for groups composed of men respectively women. A priori we find that it is 
impossible to know whether a given group will engage in the formation of collective risk, 
but via a fluctuation based game theoretical framework we are able to estimate the 
likelihood that it will happen. Our results highlight some of the foundations for creation 
of excessive collective risks relevant for example in the understanding of financial 
systemic risks.  
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At the very height of the international credit crisis and during the near collapse of the 
Icelandic banking system end of 2008, beginning 2009, the Icelandic politician Johanna 
Sigurdardottir attracted voters by promising to “end the era of testosterone”. The business 
man of the year in 2008 in Iceland was a woman, and after Sigurdardottir became prime 
minister in February 2009, half of her new ministers were chosen women. Furthermore the 
CEOs in two of the three largest banks were replaced by women. If anything this Icelandic 
tale shows that both from the public but also political side there is the conception that risky 
behaviour is an attribute deeply rooted in male decision making, especially during crisis, and 
could be avoided by including more women into the decision process. Politically as well as 
economically it is therefore important to have some solid research telling us whether there is 
some truth in such a viewpoint. The specific purposes of this paper is indeed to introduce 
tools to understand the origins behind excessive risk taking formed through synchronization 
in collective decision making, taking into account the gender issue.  
Recent research in cognitive and behavioural effects has highlighted the importance in the 
role of the endocrine system in the decision making of individuals [7-8]. For example it has 
been shown how the testosterone levels of traders in the City of London was able to predict 
their gains, whereas cortisol levels of a trader would rise with increasing uncertainty of the 
gains[7]. Later studies however showed that larger gains were only obtained by larger risk 
taking[8] Whereas such studies explains how individuals react and make their decisions in 
isolation, it does not probe how risk is created via collective decision making where the 
outcome in the decision making of one individual can influence subsequent decision makings 
of other individuals. As such the study we describe in the following can be seen as an 
example of social epistemology where the knowledge as a collective achievement is the 
knowledge of a number: the proper price of an asset[9] 
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To examine how risk at the level of a system can be created collectively we performed a 
series of trading experiments with students having at least 4 years of university studies of 
economics. The experiments were performed in the Laboratory of Experimental Economics in 
Paris (LEEP). In the experiments that ran over 60 periods the students would at each period 
receive general economic news and could decide whether to buy or sell an asset or simply do 
nothing.  At the end of the 60 periods the students would be paid pro rata according to their 
performance, for more details about the setup of the experiments see the section “Methods”.    
At the beginning of the experiment the students would be informed that initially the asset was 
properly priced according to rational expectations[14] which means that only information 
relevant to changes in dividends of the asset or interest rates should have a direct influence on 
the price of the asset. The flow of information was taken as general news from past real 
records of Bloomberg news items. The news were selected such that the general trend over 
the consecutive 60 periods was neutral, meaning that according to rational expectation there 
should be no overall price movements of the asset at the end of the 60 time periods. Thus an 
oscillatory price dynamics around the fundamental value is expected throughout the 
experiment. 
 
Figure 1 to be placed here 
.                                       
Figure 1 | Outcome of collective decision making for different groups. Figure 1a: price 
behavior (black dots) for a group of male participants. Figure 1b: adding to figure 1a a price 
history (white circles) created by collective decision making of a group of female participants. 
Figure 1c: adding initial price formation created by another group of female participants 
(white triangles) which end up with a different (risk taking) trajectory as seen in figure 1d. 
However as seen in figure 1e such collective risk taking was completely dwarfed by another 
group of male participants (black squares). Figure 1f: price formation of all 10 experiments. 
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Figure 1a shows the price behavior (black dots) for a group of male participants where the 
collective decision making of the participants created a price history fluctuating around the 
fundamental value of 5$s.  Figure 1b adds a price history (white circles) created by the 
collective decision making of a group of female participants. The resulting decision making of 
both groups looks stunningly similar throughout the two experiments. Figure 1c adds the price 
formation created by another group of female participants (white triangles). The outcome of 
the initial decision making of this group of women seems to deviate from the behavior 
reported in figures 1a-b. Indeed as seen in figure 1d the collective risk taking created by the 
group results in a value of the final price more than twice the fundamental value. However as 
seen in figure 1e such collective risk taking was completely dwarfed by the price formation 
generated by another group of male participants (black squares). Figure 1f show the price 
formation of the ensemble of the 10 experiments performed at LEEP.  
Given that the information presented to the participants is the same for all the different 
groups, how come then that one observes such seemingly different behavior between the 
groups? To answer this question a first and natural guess would be to relate the composition 
of risk taking of the participants in a given group to the outcome of collective risk taking seen 
in the experiments[15], expecting the effect of larger collective risk taking caused by larger 
individual risk taking among the participants. 
 In order to check this hypothesis we evaluated prior to each experiment the risk profile of 
each participant according to a lottery-choice experiment[2], for more information see section 
“Methods”.  As a measure of individual risk aversion we show in Table 1 the median of the 
safe choice number made by the participants in the Holt and Laury lottery-choice 
experiment[2] for a given group (the higher this number the more risk averse the choice[2]). As 
expected[2] the groups with men in general appeared less risk averse compared to the groups 
with women (overall the group with the least risk aversion was composed of men whereas the 
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2016.35
5 
 
two most risk averse groups were composed of women) but some deviations from this general 
patterns were seen.   
.  
 
 Table 1. Statistics of each experiment. 
 
Serials Gender FWHM(t=60) H&L   σ(t=5) P(t=60) 
M1 Male 32.92 4.75    0.16          107.41 
M2 Male 3.75 6.33    0.08      5.81 
M3 Male 3.14 6.00      0.21     7.56 
M4 Male 0.94 6.50     0.16     6.97 
F5 Female 1.50 7.00    0.10             6.09 
F6 Female 1.16 7.00    0.35    14.16 
F7 Female 0.45 5.33    0.22      7.38 
F8 Female 0.36 6.00      0.15   10.15 
H9 Mixed 0.44 6.00    0.18     7.16 
L10 Mixed 1.43 8.00    0.15      4.63 
 
Table 1 | statistics of the 10 experiments.  FWHM denotes the full width at half maximum 
of the loss/gain probability distribution over the duration of the experiments. H&L denotes the 
median of the safe choice number made by the participants in the Holt and Laury lottery-
choice experiment. The standard deviation of the loss/gain of the participants after five time 
steps is represented in the column σ(t=5). Finally the level of collective risk taking can be 
seen from the last column P(t=60).  
 
Most importantly the individual risk taking seen from the lottery-choice experiments did not 
translate into a larger tendency for collective risk taking in the market experiments. Out of the 
4 experiments with men, only 1 entered a collective speculative state defined by a final price 
larger than twice the fundamental price (see last column in table 1), whereas half of the 
experiments with the women entered a collective speculate state. This is so much the more 
remarkable since the individual risk taking (created collectively) in the experiments, FWHM 
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(measured by the full width at half maximum of the loss/gain probability distribution over the 
duration of the experiments), followed the tendency of the lottery-choice experiments with 3 
out of the 4 experiments with men having a FWHM at least twice the largest value of FWHM 
seen in the experiment involving women.  Furthermore it should be noted that the excessive 
price behavior made by the group of women in Figure 1d (white triangles) was made by the 
group of participants taking the least individual risks (as measured by FWHM) of all the 10 
performed market experiments.  
These facts gives a first indication that the pathway to excessive risk taking when considering 
the level of a system cannot be simply deduced from aggregate behavior of individual profiles 
of risk. To get a more thorough understanding of the conditions needed to observe excessive 
price behavior we therefore launched a series of agent based simulations[16-19] see Fig.2 for a 
graphical representation and the section Methods for a precise definition of the model.  
 
Figure 2 to be placed here 
Figure 2 | Illustration of agent based model used to understand the experiments. I) The 
agents use the direction of the last m price moves, ℎ, in their decision making, adding scores 
depending on the performance of each of their s strategies (a). II) Each agent then uses the 
best strategy and places an order (buy/sell/do nothing) (b). III) All orders from the N agents 
are collected leading to a new price movement (c). 
 
Monte Carlo simulations of the agent based model allowed us to study which parameters 
could have an impact in the creation of excessive risk behavior. Figure 3 shows the 
probability to generate collective speculative price behavior versus a control parameter 
 = 	
[	
]
(
)
 where N is the number of agents (i.e. number of participants in the experiments), s 
the number of technical analysis strategies at their disposal and M the number of periods the 
agents use in their decision making whether to buy or sell an asset. It can be shown that the 
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first term in the nominator corresponds to the number of independent technical analysis 
strategies1 that exists on a time period of length M[20] Adding the strategy which uses 
fundamental price analysis the nominator therefore gives the total number of uncorrelated 
strategies using a time horizon of M periods. The denominator gives the number of strategies 
in the pool of strategies available to the agents. A small value of  therefore describes a 
system with likely overlap in the trading strategies two agents hold, whereas a large  
describes the other limit where it becomes very unlikely to find two agents with overlap in 
trading strategies[21-22].  
 
Figure 3 to be placed here 
Figure 3 | Probability for excessive risk taking versus T for groups with different risk 
profiles.  Collective speculative price behavior, defined via a final price larger than twice the 
fundamental price, is shown versus a control parameter =	 [
	
]
(
)
 . Inset show simulations of 
games with different s, N but for fixed value of T and m≡2. The different symbols correspond 
to simulations done with populations having different risk profiles. 
 
One of our main findings is that a given fixed M and T lead to the same probability to create 
excessive price behavior, see inset of Figure 3 which presents simulations of games with 
different s, N but for fixed value of T and m≡2. The simulations were done for agents using 
their total return as payoff function (the $-Game[16]), but different choices of payoff function 
(see description in the following) gave similar behavior. 
In order to take into account populations of agents with different risk and loss aversion, we 
then modified the payoff function of their strategies accordingly  = 	 
/		
	/	
 with R 
the return of the strategy at the end of the 60 time periods and ± the standard deviation of the 
                                                             
1 For technical analysis strategies using the direction of the price moves 
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losses (-s) respective gains (+s). The magnitude of the two exponents α and β defines the risk 
aversion whereas their difference in magnitude defines the amount of loss aversion.  For α  = 
β = 0 the payoff corresponds to the pure $-Game whereas for α = β = 1 the payoff is similar to 
the Sharpe Ratio. Increasing α , β corresponds to a population with increasing risk aversion. 
The case α > β corresponds to strategies which are loss averse, a well-documented human bias 
documented in Prospect Theory[23,24]. Figure 3 shows simulations done with different values 
of α and β for m=2 and m=4. Comparing populations with varying degree of risk aversion (α 
= β ≠ 0) and different loss aversion (α > β) to the population without risk aversion (α = β = 0  
- fat solid lines), one can see that populations with different risk profiles have a negligible 
impact on the probability for formation of collective risk taking. As discussed beforehand this 
result is accordance with the observed behavior in the experiments where the risk composition 
of the groups in general seemed to have little impact on the collective formation of risk.  
We will never know in every detail the precise reasoning behind the decision making of each 
individual in the experiments. However having performed interviews with participants after 
each experiment it seems reasonable to assume a general use of some few strategies taking 
into account the price evolution over the last few time periods. Assuming the use of say s=3-5 
strategies, the experimentally observed probability of 3/10 to create excessive risk taking, fits 
nicely the predictions coming from game theory for a population using the last m=4 time 
periods in their decision making. This is seen by comparing the populations with different risk 
profiles obtained in the simulation, to the horizontal line indicating the range of T values 
corresponding to experiments with participants using  m=4 and 3< s < 5. 
Our experimental findings of how synchronization in a population can occur have been 
supported by results from game theory and simulations. Returning to image of soldiers 
crossing a bridge in the introduction of this article, we have seen that it is not how hard each 
soldier tramp that matters (i.e. the individual risk taking), rather the tendency to synchronize 
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is the responsible factor in formation of collective risks. Specifically the idea of 
synchronization could prove relevant in a proper understanding of, for example, how systemic 
risks are formed in financial markets. However, the phenomenon of synchronization could 
well play a more general role in social interactions as well as opinion formation; examples 
include democratic elections[26,27], phone calls[28], email communication[29] and people 
clapping in phase during rhythmic applause[30].   
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Methods 
Experimental setup.  A series of 10 experiments were performed in the Laboratory of 
Experimental Economics in Paris (LEEP, http://leep.univ-paris1.fr/accueil.htm) with students 
having at least 4 years of university studies of economics. The experiments were grouped into 
a series of 8 experiments each with 10 participants, 4 of the experiments with male and 4 with 
female participants and 2 experiments where an initial group of 20 participants (female and 
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male) were divided into two groups according to their risk preference.   The students received 
6 euros just for their presence and were in addition awarded by attending a lottery used to 
access the individual risk profiles of the participants[4]. The lottery had an averaged payoff of 
10 euros. The final and most important part of the experiment was a financial market 
experiment, see Figure 4. 
Figure 4 to be placed here.                                                 
Figure 4 Setup of financial market experiment. Screenshot of terminal used by the 
participants showing the commonly shared information, price evolution, portfolio value as 
well as buy/sell buttons.  
 
Each experiment ran over 60 time periods lasting 15 seconds each. In each time period a 
participant could chose to either do nothing, to buy, or to sell one share of an asset. The initial 
price of the asset was fixed to 5$s with an expectation of a 10cents dividend payout at the end 
of the 60 time periods. The participants were told that the asset was correctly priced according 
to rational expectations[14], that is, the price of the asset was  supposed to correctly reflect all 
future discounted cash flow accrued to the asset. Each time period presented the students with 
some short (a couple of lines) general financial information taken from real financial news 
items obtained on Bloomberg over a two week period of time. The students were told the 
asset represented a portfolio of assets like an ETF or an index. They were all simultaneously 
presented the same information meant to reflect general financial news like e.g. bad or good 
U.S. employment numbers, price changes of commodities, price changes in currencies, etc.  
The news items were the same in all 10 experiments and had been chosen so as not to have 
any overall positive or negative bias.  At the end of each time period the orders of the 
participants were gathered and a new price would be calculated based on the order imbalance 
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(with sign and magnitude determining direction respectively size of price movement) and 
shown to the participants graphically on their computer screen. Throughout the experiment 
the participants had a continuous update of the number of shares held and their gains/losses. 
The participants could borrow money to buy shares at an interest rate of zero and short selling 
was allowed. In the end of each of the 10 experiments a pool of 200 euros was distributed, pro 
rata, among the participants who had a positive gain. 
 
Multi-agent based modeling. As a theoretical framework to understand the outcome of the 
experiments we have used the $-Game[16] which is a multi-agent agent based  model that 
corresponds closely to the setup of the experiments. The game consists of N agents which 
(like the participants in the experiments) at each time period can buy, sell a share or simply do 
nothing. In the decision making of the agents they have at their disposal s technical analysis 
strategies (assigned randomly at the beginning of the game), trying to profit from the 
directions of the m past price trends, as well as a fundamental analysis strategy, based on the 
expectation of future dividends, buying when the present price is considered undervalued and 
selling when overvalued. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the model, with prices 
increasing whenever there are more buyers than sellers via: 
( + 1) = ()!
"#$"%%	&"'()&(*)
+,-.,&,*/
       (1) 
similarly to the price update used for the experiments (the liquidity was chosen as  in the 
experiments). Figure 2 also illustrates the importance of feedback loops seen in both the 
experiments and the agent based simulations: as the market changes, the strategies of the 
participants change which in turn itself changes the market. In the $-Game the payoff function 
of the strategies is given by the return implied by a given decision of the strategy. 
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